In this paper, we formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor force participation and fertility choices and estimate approximate decision rules using data on married women in Italy, Spain and France. The pattern of estimated state dependence effects across countries is consistent with aggregate patterns in part-time employment and child care availability, suggesting that labor market rigidities and lack of child care options are important sources of state dependence. Simulations of the model reveal that Italian and Spanish women would substantially increase their participation rates were they to face the French institutional environment.
Introduction
The growth in women's participation in the labor market, especially among women with children, has been one of the most important economic and social phenomena of the last half century. The large scale movement of women into the labor market after World War II has occurred in many countries, but the level of female employment across countries has not been equalized, and the differential female employment patterns across countries is not well understood. This is true even within Western Europe. Cross-country differences in female labor force participation and attachment within Europe have recently raised serious concerns, particularly in the context of the European Union's attempt to harmonize social policies. 1 In order to try and better understand cross country differences in female employment patterns, we formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of labor market participation and fertility choices, and estimate approximate decision rules using data on married women in Italy, Spain and France. Limiting the set of countries to only those with "similar" cultural characteristics helps control for unobservable differences such as religion and attitudes towards gender roles. Estimated differences in the relative importance of state dependence and permanent unobserved heterogeneity in life cycle work and fertility choices across these three countries are then correlated with differences in underlying institutions governing employment and social policies.
The reason for focusing on the relative importance of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in work and fertility choices in each country is that past research on female labor force participation rates has repeatedly revealed that persistence is an important aspect of the labor supply decisions of married women (see, e.g., Heckman and Willis (1977) , Nakamura and Nakamura (1985) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) ). Serial persistence in participation may be due to state dependence deriving from human capital accumulation or the costs of searching for a new job. For example, a woman leaving the labor market 1 At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, the European Council stated that Member States should set quantitative targets for higher employment rates in line with EU targets. These were set at 70% for total employment and 60% for women's employment, to be reached by the year 2010. In 2001, intermediate targets of 67% (total) and 57% (for women) were set to be reached by 2005. 2 to care for a new born may be likely to remain out of the labor market the following year because her human capital (work experience) has "depreciated". It is also possible that job search costs increase with age and differ across participation states.
Serial persistence can also be due to permanent unobserved heterogeneity which reßects differences in mostly immutable preferences for work and/or productivity in the labor market. For example, a woman may not leave the labor market because she has strong preferences for a career. In this case, the unobserved individual component determines current participation irrespective of past participation. Unless properly accounted for, unobserved heterogeneity leads to the possibility of spurious state dependence, in which it appears that working in the past increases the probability of working today, when in fact causality ßows from the unobservable to all period-speciÞc choices.
Accurately distinguishing between state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity is not only theoretically interesting, it can also be important for policy evaluation. If there is substantial permanent unobserved heterogeneity then time spent out the labor market around the time of childbirth will have little effect on subsequent employment probabilities.
If there is substantial state dependence then having a child, which lowers participation in the short run, will also lower future employment levels because women are not continuing to build human capital or are missing training opportunities. In this latter case, policies aimed at reducing fertility-related absences may reduce human capital depreciation and increase long-run labor market attachment.
Several recent studies of female labor supply have focused on the role of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Hyslop (1999) and Carrasco (2001) ) but, to the best of our knowledge, there is no work that analyzes the differential relative importance of these two factors across countries. In this paper, we hypothesize that in addition to human capital accumulation and search costs, institutional factors (which make it costly to adjust employment levels from one period to the next for agents on both sides of the market) are important underlying sources of cross-country differences in the degree of state dependence.
We believe that the estimated variation in the relative importance of state dependence in female labor supply across countries can, in large part, be attributed to differences in the social policy environment, especially regarding labor market ßexibility and child care 3 availability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief background on the relationship between female labor market participation and fertility choices that motivates our model of joint decision-making. In Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 outlines our model of labor market participation and fertility decisions.
Section 5 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 6 presents estimation results. Section 7 relates the estimation results to the social policy environment in each country and performs simulations which quantify the effect of the institutional environment on participation and fertility outcomes. The simulations indicate that Italian and Spanish women would substantially increase their participation rates were they to face the relatively more ßexible French employment and child care environment. The last section of the paper summarizes and concludes.
Background
In research on female labor supply behavior, the vast majority of empirical studies Þnd a negative effect of fertility on labor supply. However, the effect may not be causal. The negative correlation may be the result of selection effects where women with stronger preferences for motherhood are also those with lower unobservable skills and motivation in the labor market. Using cross sectional data, Mroz (1987) tested the sensitivity of the parameters of the labor supply equation of married women with respect to a number of assumptions, including the exogeneity of fertility. He concludes that conditional on participation, fertility is exogenous to women's labor supply. However, using panel data, Jakubson (1988) arrives at the opposite conclusion. His results reject the exogeneity of fertility hypothesis.
The potential endogeneity of fertility has also been addressed by adopting an instrumental variables methodology. In searching for instruments, researchers have looked at sources of unplanned births (e.g., the presence of twins (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) ), and the availability and cost of contraceptives (Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) ). Angrist and Evans (1998) suggest the use of the sibling-sex composition as an instrumental variable, given the plausible exogeneity of sibling-sex composition and the observed correlation between hav-4 ing two children of the same sex and further childbearing. However, this latter approach is particularly difficult to implement using European data since the number of women in Europe with at least two children is typically very small. The main challenge confronting the IV empirical strategy has, not surprisingly, been one of Þnding suitable instruments.
On a somewhat different track, and more in line with the suggestions of Browning (1992), Hyslop (1999) studies the relationship between participation and fertility by estimating dynamic discrete choice models of female labor force participation. His results indicate that when dynamic factors in female labor supply are excluded, fertility is not exogenous. However, in dynamic speciÞcations with serially correlated errors and/or lagged participation outcomes, he Þnds no evidence against the exogeneity of fertility hypothesis. One drawback of Hyslop's approach is that he excludes the possibility of interactions between the participation history and fertility as well as a speciÞc (linear) correlation structure between the explanatory variables and the unobservables.
It thus seems fair to say that economists' ability to explain the link between participation and fertility has been decidedly limited. In particular, the difficulty of Þnding suitable instruments and the very mixed results when testing the exogeneity of fertility hypothesis strongly suggests that fertility decisions should be examined in a more realistic manner, in which the jointness of fertility and labor market participation decisions is directly taken into account (as in Moffitt (1984) , Hotz and Miller (1988) , Francesconi (2002) , Del Boca In this paper, we follow this latter approach by considering labor supply and fertility decisions as being jointly planned over the life-cycle. Labor market participation and fertility decision rules are simultaneously determined in our model, in the sense that they are generated by a common constrained lifetime utility maximization problem. We estimate the (approximate) decision rules of the utility maximization model by linking it with a dynamic bivariate probit model with a rich error structure. We then use the estimated approximate decision rules to infer the effect of institutional factors related to employment and social polices on the joint labor market participation and fertility choices of married women. 5 
Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the European Community Household Panel 3 The statistics show large differences in female education levels between countries. For example, in Italy only 8% of the women have tertiary education levels, while in Spain and France the proportions are much higher, 20% and 28%, respectively. The proportion of women whose youngest child in the household is 3 years old or younger is similar in Italy and Spain but relatively higher in France. France also has the highest mean annual partner's earnings (in thousands of Euros), female labor market participation rate, and annual birth rate. The raw data display a positive correlation across countries in work and fertility outcomes. Table 1 also compares the means of women who do not work all eight years and those who do work all eight years. In all three countries, women who always work are more highly educated and are less likely to have a child in the house than those who never work. Thus, there is the expected negative correlation between fertility and labor supply within each country. Note that the majority of the sample in each country consists of women who either work all eight years or never work. In each country, mean annual partner's earnings are higher amongst women who always work suggesting a complicated non-labor income effect.
In order to get a better picture of changes over time, Figures 1 and 2 display patterns in annual labor market participation rates and annual birth rates over the sample period in each country. Figure 1 illustrates that participation rates over the sample period are always highest in France, second highest in Italy, and lowest in Spain. However, participation rates in Spain converge to those in Italy, while Italian participation rates remain mostly 2 Nicoletti and Peracchi (2003) analyze the determinants of non-response in the ECHP. They Þnd that attrition after wave 1 is mostly due to migration. Individuals that entered the ECHP after wave 1 were likely to be out of the scope of the survey at that time. 3 Birth outcomes in the eigth year (wave 8) of the survey are not observed due to a censoring problem. The persistence in female labor supply is illustrated in Table 2 , which displays the distribution of years worked over the sample period, separately by country. In Italy, the proportion of women who always work and who never work are quite similar, 36% and 39%, respectively. These two modal points account for three-quarters of the distribution. In Spain, relatively less women always work than in Italy, 21%, but more women never work, 46%. The percentages in France are quite different: a larger proportion of women always work, 45%, and a smaller proportion never work ,17%. In all three countries, the two modal points in the distribution are at the "corners". 4 Strong persistence in labor supply is also displayed in Table 3 , which presents, by country, average rates of transition between employment states from year t-1 to year t. The transition rates illustrate that, in France, it is more common for a women to move from nonparticipation to participation than from participation to nonparticipation. In Spain, the opposite is true. In Italy, these two types of transitions occur with equal probability. The diagonals of the transition matrices also suggest that there is an important relationship between persistence and participation: more persistence is associated with lower participation rates. 5 4 The descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2 can be readily compared to similar statistics for the US reported in Hyslop (1999) , and for Germany reported in Croda and Kyriazidou (2004) . For example, in both the US and Germany, women who always work are more educated and also have fewer young children than those who never work, but they have lower mean nonlabor income. In the PSID, 48% of married women in the sample always work (11% never work) while in the GSEOP the proportion is 38.5% (15% never work). 5 Analyzing gender gaps in unemployment, Azmat, Guell, and Manning (2004) , have shown that in Italy and Spain, where more women are unemployed relative to men, females are more likely to move from 8 
Model
In this section we develop a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor supply and birth decisions that guides the empirical work that follows. The model is similar to the decision framework in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Francesconi (2002) , however, since we estimate approximate decision rules rather than exact decision rules, our approach more closely resembles that in Keane and Wolpin (2001a).
Consider a married women i who maximizes remaining discounted lifetime utility by choosing, in each year t, whether or not to participate in the labor market, h it , and whether or not to give birth, b it . We abstract from the part-time, full-time (hours) margin and fertility complications/timing issues by assuming that planned live births can occur with certainty within the same year t.
Remaining lifetime utility at time t for woman i is given by
where τ is the theoretical start of the decision process, T is the end of the decision horizon, δ is the subjective discount factor, and S it is the state space at time t. V it (S it ) is the value function and U it (h it , b it ) is the utility ßow.
The maximization problem in (1) can be cast in terms of alternative speciÞc value functions, V bh it (S it ), that follow Bellman's equation, i.e.,
where the utility ßow is assumed to be
employment to unemployment and less likely to enter from unemployment to employment, compared to males.
γ 0h in (3) is the marginal utility of working in year t, which could be negative if there is a utility cost to work effort. C it is current period consumption and γ 1h measures the extent to which the marginal utility of consumption varies with participation status. Lagged participation, h i,t−1 , affects current period utility and γ 2h captures the cost of adjusting participation status. N it is the number of children in the household and γ 3h is the marginal utility of an additional child when participating in the labor market relative to not participating. N it follows the law of motion
γ 0b is the marginal utility (or disutility) of giving birth in year t, and ε h it and ε b it are shocks to the utility of working and giving birth, respectively.
The per-period budget constraint in the maximization problem is assumed to be
where y f it is the woman's labor market earnings in year t and y m it is the partner's labor market earnings (non-labor income). C n represents the goods-cost per child.
After substituting (5) and (4) into (3), the four utility ßows relevant for the corresponding alternative speciÞc value functions V bh it (S it ) become
Further, let the female earnings functions be
where g (·) is an unspeciÞed function of the covariate vector, x 0 it , accumulated actual work experience during the sample period, H it , and a productivity shock, ε f it . The vector of covariates x 0 it contains proxies for accumulated human capital prior to the start of the sample period. That is,
where E iτ i is the education level at the start of the sample period for individual i, t = τ i , and a τ i is the woman's age at t = τ i . 6 a iτ i and a 2 iτ i control for accumulated (potential) work experience prior to t = τ i . Accumulated
(actual) work experience during the sample period follows the follows the law of motion
The initial condition is
Assuming no serial correlation in the error terms ε f it , ε h it and ε b it , (6) and (7) imply that the set of state variables, S hb it , corresponding to each choice combination is distinct. SpeciÞcally,
In the case of serial correlation, which we consider in estimation, the S hb it 's are simply augmented with the past values of the error terms.
Note that even though S hb it 's in (7) differ by choice combination, the decision rules of the optimization problem depend on the entire state space, S it , as indicated in (1) and (2). This is because the value of a particular choice combination is computed by comparing the values of all choice combinations. S it is the union of S 00 it , S 10 it , S 01 it , and S 11 it , and each choice probability is a function of S it rather than the corresponding subset S hb it in (7). To see this more clearly, consider, without loss of generality, the myopic version of the model. In the myopic version of the model there is no future component to the alternative 6 The Þrst period of observed data (t = τ i) for each woman will generally not be the start of the theoretical decision process for all individuals, t = τ . How we deal with this initial conditions problem will be described in more detail below. speciÞc value functions, i.e., δ = 0. 8 
Estimation of approximate decision rules, in either myopic or dynamic versions of the model, simply involves choosing a particular speciÞcation for P r
tribution of the optimization model is to provide a theoretical grounding for the common set of covariates, S it , that appears in estimating equations. For the dynamic utility maximization model speciÞed above, S it , is
Estimation
In this section, we detail our empirical strategy for estimating the approximate decision rules of the dynamic optimization problem described above. In the Þrst subsection, we develop the connection between the approximate decision rules and a dynamic bivariate probit model with nonparametric correlated random effects and AR(1) serially correlated transitory errors. In the second subsection, we outline the simulated maximum likelihood (SML) algorithm used to estimate the empirical model. 8 In the dynamic version of the model, each alternative speciÞc value function at time t has S it as an argument by virtue of the fact that the expected maximum future returns component compares the values of all choice combinations in the future.
A Dynamic Bivariate Probit with Nonparametric Correlated Random Effects and AR(1) Errors
We estimate the approximate decision rules of the optimization problem developed in the previous section by specifying P r ¡ F hb it (S it ) > 0 ¢ in the following way,
here f (·) is the bivariate normal density. The choice probabilities in (10) are those of a bivariate probit model. 9 H * it and B * it in (10) are assumed to be the following functions of the state space S it from the optimization model,
it , ε h it , ε b it´a re composites of the original error terms in S it .
In order to produce a nonparametric random effects bivariate probit, assume that the g h (·) and g b (·) functions transform the original error terms so that we get the following structure for u h it and u b it ,
One could also adopt a speciÞcation for P r ! F 
where A 1 is a dummy variable for unobserved "type" 1, A 2 is a dummy variable for unobserved "type" 2, and A 0 is a dummy for unobserved "type" 0, which is the base type. 10 The three type probabilities, which deÞne the discrete nonparametric distribution of the individual effects, are given the following structure,
where The type probabilities in (14) are functions of permanent nonlabor income y m ip and education E iτ i . Permanent nonlabor income is calculated as the log of the sample average of partner's annual earnings over the sample period. Because both nonlabor income and the education are potentially endogenous, specifying the type probabilities as a function of these variables produces a nonparametric correlated random effects version of the dynamic bivariate probit model. 11 1 0 In preliminary estimations, three types were found to Þt the data better than two. Four types did not produce a signiÞcant increase in the value of the log-likelihood function.
1 1 Preliminary estimations indicated that separate permanent and transitory nonlabor income effects were hard to empirically identify when entered into both (11) and (14) . The log of annual earnings was, however, easily identiÞed when it appeared as the only nonlabor income variable in (11), and the log of permanent nonlabor income was easily identiÞed when it appeared as the only nonlabor income variable in (14) .
In addition to nonparametric correlated random effects, we allow the transitory shock ξ h it in (12) to be AR(1) serially correlated. Serial correlation in ξ h it may arise, for example, from unobserved female wage offer shocks that persist over time. 12 The transitory shocks take the form,
where v j it , j = h, b are assumed to be independent and distributed standard normal. 13 In order to address the initial conditions problem that arises in dynamic discrete choice models in general, we employ the Heckman approximate solution (Heckman (1981) ). The Heckman approximation involves specifying H * it and B * it functions in the initial sample period, t = τ i , with no lagged endogenous state variables, distinct coefficients from those in (11), and error terms that are correlated with the error terms during the sample period. Accordingly, we specify H * iτ i and B * iτ i as, Estimation of the dynamic bivariate probit model described above is difficult using classical maximum likelihood techniques. Calculation of the choice probabilities with AR (1) serially correlated errors requires multiple integration, which generally causes standard 1 2 Following the overwhelming majority of the related literature on labor market participation, we substitute out for the wage and do not incorporate observed wage data in estimation (see, e.g., Magnac (2000) ).
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) is an exception. quadrature techniques to breakdown. Estimating by SML is a more computationally practical approach. The particular SML algorithm that we use to estimate the model, described brießy below, was originally developed in Keane and Wolpin (2001b) for estimating the exact decision rules of dynamic programming problems. The algorithm was shown in Keane and Sauer (2005) to be also useful for estimating more general dynamic discrete choice models of the type formulated above.
The SML Algorithm
The SML algorithm that we employ can be outlined, for simplicity, as follows. Denote the observed data by {h
, where
is woman i's reported birth history, and
is the history of covariates. Unconditional simulation of the likelihood function proceeds in the following way,
to form the correlated error sequences
This involves drawing uniform and standard normal variates according to (13) , (14) , and (15).
Given
, and
, and M simulated birth histories,
for each woman i, according to (11) and (16) where
Construct the classiÞcation error rates
for each woman i (see below), where j denotes the simulated choice h m it (b m it ) and k denotes the reported choice h * it (b * it ).
4. Form an unbiased simulator of the likelihood contribution for each woman i as:
where θ is the vector of model parameters.
The two classiÞcation error rates (out of the four that appear in (17) ) that are estimated along with the other parameters of the model are
where π 00tm = 1 − π 01tm and π 11tm = 1 − π 10tm . Note that the probability of reporting a particular choice is allowed to be a function of the true (simulated) choice but is not directly affected by covariates. ClassiÞcation error in reported participation status is also assumed to be independent of classiÞcation error in reported birth outcomes, and both are constrained to occur at the same rate. 14 The classiÞcation error rates in (17) are given a logistic form to ensure that the probabilities remain between zero and one. For more details on the algorithm, a discussion of identiÞcation, and an illustration of the biases that arise if classiÞcation error is not accounted for in non-linear discrete choice models, see Keane and Sauer (2006). representing achievement of secondary and tertiary levels of education, respectively (as in Table 1 ). The stock of children at the beginning of period t, N it , is also split into two dummy variables.
Estimation Results

Point Estimates and Standard Errors
One dummy is for the youngest child being three years of age or less and the other is for the youngest child being older than three. The base category is no children at all (also as in Table 1 ). In addition, the H * it and B * it functions in (11) and (16) are augmented to include year and region effects within each country.
The Þrst two columns of Table 4 present the estimation results for France. Column indicate that, on average, type 1 and 2 women account for three-quarters of the population, with type 1 individuals being the majority, 53%. Nonlabor income and education have signiÞcant effects on a woman's unobserved type (not shown in the table). The signiÞcance of these variables implies that nonlabor income and education are endogenous, and that it was important to account for this in estimation (albeit indirectly).
The estimated classiÞcation error rates for France, shown below the estimated type probabilities, reveal that the probability of reporting to be participating in the labor market, when the true state is nonparticipation, is .065. The probability of reporting to be not participating, when the true state is participation, is .021. 16 Although small in magnitude, both classiÞcation error rates are signiÞcantly different from zero. Note that ignoring even a small amount of classiÞcation error can lead to large biases in the importance of unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence. 17 Columns (3) − (6) display the corresponding results for Italy and Spain, respectively.
The point estimates are, qualitatively, similar to those reported in Columns (1) and (2) for France. Interestingly, the same pattern of coefficients on the type dummies are obtained in both the work and birth equations. Previous participation status is also very important, as is serial correlation in the transitory errors. In contrast to France, in both Italy and Spain, accumulated actual work experience signiÞcantly decreases the propensity to give birth.
There are also differences in the type proportions in the population, indicating signiÞcantly different distributions of permanent unobserved heterogeneity across the three countries.
Nonlabor income and education also signiÞcantly affect the type probabilities in Italy and Spain. The classiÞcation error rates for Italy and Spain are similarly small in magnitude but signiÞcantly different from zero, as for France.
Linearized Marginal Effects and Relative Importance Decomposition
The top panel of Table 5 reports selected marginal effects, corresponding to the point estimates reported in Table 4 Table 5 . The base speciÞcation for both the work and birth equations includes only the observed covariates (nonlabor income, fertility outcome dummies, age and education dummies).
The adjusted R-squared when only observed covariates are included in the participation equation, R 2 1 , is quite low. R 2 1 is .06 in France, .13 in Italy and .14 in Spain. Adding the Þxed effects (year and region dummies) to the base speciÞcation yields a R 2 2 which is only slightly higher than R 2 1 . Adding the value of the simulated serially correlated shock only to the base speciÞcation has a more substantial effect. R According to the way we perform a relative importance decomposition, state dependence is clearly the most important factor in explaining the persistence in participation status.
State dependence is also relatively more important in Italy and Spain than in France. The corresponding exercise for birth outcomes shows, in contrast, that the observable covariates (including age and fertility) and unobserved heterogeneity are the most important determinants of the propensity to give birth.
Discussion
The estimation results presented in the previous section reveal substantial cross-country variation in both the level of female labor market participation and the extent of state dependence. In particular, we Þnd that state dependence is stronger in Italy and Spain (where labor market participation rates are relatively lower) compared to France, while unobserved heterogeneity is relatively more important in France than it is in Italy and Spain.
While it is true that some of the cross-country differences in the relative importance of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity may reßect cultural attitudes regarding gender roles, they may also reßect systematic differences in the institutional constraints faced by individuals. Given the relative homogeneity of the three countries under consideration, we believe the second aspect is likely to be the most important.
In the next subsection, we analyze a set of aggregate statistics on employment protection, part-time work availability and child care in France, Italy and Spain, and note a connection between these statistics and the pattern of state dependence effects estimated in the model. In the second subsection, we use the estimated approximate decision rules to perform additional simulations. SpeciÞcally, we quantify the effect of the institutional environment on participation and fertility choices by examining how these choices would change if women in one country were to face the institutional constraints (estimated decision rule parameters) of another country.
Labor Market Rigidities and Inadequate Child Care Options
The constraints faced by individuals in the three countries under consideration can be readily compared through aggregate statistics on employment protection, part-time work availability and child care. Consider Þrst the employment protection index. The employment protection index ranks countries on the basis of employment protection legislation (EPL), i.e., on the basis of regulations governing individual dismissals and hiring of workers (e.g., severance pay and advance notice). Theoretical models clearly indicate that employment should be more stable and individual employment relationships more durable when EPL is stricter. Given a constant cyclical wage pattern, higher Þring costs stabilize employment in downturns but also deter employers from hiring in upturns. To the extent that Þring costs prevent termination of existing employment relationships, sharp employment reduction is less likely in countries with stringent job security provisions. Stricter EPL should, therefore, be associated not only with lower labor market participation rates, but also stronger state dependence effects.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows a ranking of Italy, Spain and France in terms of EPL.
The ranking does not reveal sharp differences between the three countries, but Italy does have a higher index score as well as the greatest degree of estimated state dependence. Differences between Italy, Spain and France, consistent with the pattern of estimated state dependence effects, also arise when we consider child care outcomes. Column (3) reports the percentage of children less than three years of age in child care. Italy and Spain have very low percentages, while in France the percentage is considerably higher. Column (4) compares the average opening hours of child care (for children less than three years of age). France has greater availability of child care on this measure as well. Column (5) compares child beneÞts as a percentage of GDP. The French percentage far exceeds the percentages in Italy and Spain, which are both less than 1% of GDP. 18 The data in Table 6 clearly indicate that in Italy and Spain, relative to France, both market and nonmarket options for working mothers are more limited. Part-time work is in relatively scarce supply, beneÞts for families with children are much lower, and child care services are typically inadequate in quantity and characterized by extreme rigidity in the number of weekly hours available (Del Boca (2002) ). Women that decide to bear a child either do not withdraw from the labor market or never re-enter after childbirth.
Moreover, women that are employed tend to have full-time work commitments, which is not compatible with having many children, so overall fertility is lower (Boeri, Del Boca and Pissarides (2005) ). Thus, countries with less labor market ßexibility and less family friendly policies have individuals concentrated more often in the always work and never work categories. The costs of changing employment from one period to the next are higher, generating a greater extent of state dependence in female labor market participation.
Measuring the Effect of the Institutional Environment
In Table 7 , we report the results of a simulation exercise which further quantiÞes the inßuence of the institutional environment on labor market participation and birth rates. In the simulation, predicted participation and birth outcomes are generated for each women in one country, using the SML estimates of the approximate decision rules for an alternative country. The results of the counterfactual exercise are partial equilibrium only, in the sense that the background characteristics (education, nonlabor income, etc.) are assumed to remain the same after changing the institutional environment. In order to partially address this problem, the effects of permanent unobserved heterogeneity and serial correlation are neutralized in the simulation.
In the top panel of Table 7 
Conclusion
In this paper, we formulated a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor force participation and fertility choices and estimated approximate decision rules using data from the ECHP on married women in Italy, Spain and France. Focusing on a small set of culturally similar countries helps isolate the underlying institutional causes of cross-country variation in the relative importance of permanent unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence in female labor market participation decisions. The estimation results indicate that state dependence is the most important factor in determining life cycle female labor supply in each of the three countries. State dependence effects are stronger in Italy and Spain relative to France, and the estimated pattern of state dependence effects is highly consistent with the differential availability of part-time employment opportunities and child care across the three countries.
Our study suggests that more severe labor market rigidities and relatively more inadequate child care options are important underlying sources of state dependence in female labor supply behavior. This is in addition to the "usual suspects" of human capital accumulation and search costs that depend on employment status. We also quantify the effects of the institutional environment by simulating counterfactual female participation and birth outcomes when women in one country face the institutional environment (approximate decision rule parameters) of a different country. The results of the simulation indicate that Italian and Spanish women would substantially increase their average participation rates were they to face the relatively more ßexible French employment and child care environment. Note: All speciÞcations also include a quadratic in age, year and region dummies. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the simulated percentage point changes assuming no permanent unobserved heterogeneity or transitory serial correlation.
